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ABSTRACT: In A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that extant attempts to 
explicate experiential justification—by stipulation, introspection, conceptual analysis, 
thought experimentation, and/or appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases—are 
unsuccessful. He draws the following conclusion: “armchair methods” such as these are 
inadequate to the task. Instead, empirical methods should be used to investigate the 
distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification and to address 
questions concerning the nature, extent, and existence of the a priori. In this essay, I show 
that Casullo has not refuted armchair explications of experiential justification, in 
particular those that appeal to introspectively accessible phenomenology. I do this by 
presenting a phenomenal theory of experiential justification that (a) has a significant 
degree of initial plausibility and (b) survives Casullo’s general attack on such theories. As a 
result, a premise in the central argument for Casullo’s signature proposal concerning the a 
priori is undermined. 
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1. Introduction  
Are any beliefs justified a priori? This central epistemological question is often 
thought to reduce to the question of whether any beliefs are non-experientially 
justified. To answer the latter question, however, it seems that we must be able to 
distinguish non-experiential justification from its experiential counterpart. And to 
do that, we need an explication of experiential justification. 
In the important book A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that 
extant attempts to explicate experiential justification—whether by stipulation, 
introspection, conceptual analysis, thought experimentation, and/or appeal to 
intuitions about hypothetical cases—are unsuccessful.1 He draws the following 
pessimistic conclusion: these methods (hereafter “armchair methods”) just aren’t 
suitable for the task. Instead, Casullo claims, empirical methods should be used to 
investigate the distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification 
                                                        
1 Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 147-185. 
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and to address questions concerning the nature, extent, and/or existence of a priori 
justification. He writes: 
I argue that [no extant proposals for articulating the relevant concept of 
experience by use of armchair methods] succeeds, and I propose viewing 
"experience" as a putative natural kind term whose extension is fixed by reference 
to the cognitive processes associated with the five senses. Whether those 
processes have important common properties, and, if so, what they are, are 
questions to be settled by empirical studies of human cognition. In short, 
uncovering the nature of experience is a matter for empirical, rather than a priori, 
investigation.2 
It follows that, since the a priori/a posteriori distinction rests upon an 
account of the nature of experience (in the relevant sense), if the latter is a matter 
for largely or exclusively empirical investigation, then the same should hold true 
for the a priori/a posteriori distinction.3 
The preceding argument can be reconstructed as an instance of modus 
ponens: 
(1) If armchair methods cannot provide an adequate account of experiential 
justification, then we should largely or exclusively employ empirical methods to 
investigate the a priori/a posteriori distinction. 
(2) Armchair methods cannot provide an adequate account of experiential 
justification. 
(3) Thus, we should largely or exclusively employ empirical methods to 
investigate the a priori/a posteriori distinction. 
In what follows, I rebut premise (2) of Casullo’s argument. I do this by 
showing that he has not decisively refuted explications of experiential justification 
that appeal to introspectively accessible phenomenology (hereafter “phenomenal 
theories”). It should be emphasized that Casullo’s signature contribution to 
contemporary literature on the a priori is his development and defense of (3). Thus, 
                                                        
2 Casullo, A Priori Justification, 148. 
3 Casullo’s writings suggest, at times, that he thinks the a priori, construed as a general research 
topic, should only be investigated using empirical methods. But I’m not sure whether the 
writings that I discuss here imply methodological exclusivism. This depends, in part, on (a) how 
the a priori qua research topic is understood and (b) how empirical methods are distinguished 
from armchair methods. And this brief essay is no place to take up these difficult questions. For 
this reason, I formulate Casullo’s first premise using the disjunction “largely or exclusively.” 
Note, too, that even the non-exclusivist conclusion that we should largely employ empirical 
methods to investigate the a priori is both novel and provocative.  
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if, as I contend, the primary argument Casullo deploys in support of (3) has a false 
premise, this is a significant result.   
I proceed by three steps. First, I propose a prima facie plausible phenomenal 
theory. Second, I introduce Casullo’s critique of phenomenal theories and show 
that the theory I propose survives it. Third, I consider an alternative way of 
interpreting Casullo’s critique of phenomenal theories. I then argue that it too fails. 
As a result, a central plank of Casullo’s platform in A Priori Justification—namely, 
a premise of the primary argument for his most original and provocative claim 
about the a priori—is undermined.  
2. A Phenomenal Theory of Experiential Justification 
In this section, I put forward an account of experiential justification that is based 
upon the role that introspectively accessible phenomenological properties play in 
securing justified belief. This account has a significant degree of initial plausibility 
insofar as it (a) captures and articulates a notion of experiential justification that is 
common to epistemological discourse and (b) yields a promising distinction 
between a priori and a posteriori justifications that correctly classifies most of the 
paradigm cases of each. Although I do not claim that my account is beyond 
correction, I am confident that it is not vulnerable to Casullo’s attack on 
phenomenal theories of experiential justification.  
I begin with a stipulative definition of experience: 
(EXP): For any mental state m, m is an experiential state iff m has phenomenal 
character.4 
David Chalmers describes the phenomenal character of an experience as 
“what it is like to have that experience.”5 He continues: “Two perceptual 
experiences share their phenomenal character if what it is like to have one is the 
same as what it is like to have the other. We can say that in such a case, the 
                                                        
4 Although (EXP) is introduced as a stipulative definition, it can be justified by reflection on 
paradigm experiential states, such as those associated with the five standard sensory modalities. 
For the sake of expository economy, I leave this task to the reader. I should note, in addition, 
that something close to this definition is de rigor among philosophers who work on knowledge, 
mind, and perception. For example, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Siegel writes “It is 
definitional of experiences… that they have some phenomenal character, or more briefly, some 
phenomenology." See: Susanna Siegel, “The Contents of Perception,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ perception-contents/, 
2016. 
5 David Chalmers, “Perception and the Fall from Eden,” in Perceptual Experience, ed. Tamar 
Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 50.  
R.M. Farley 
182 
experiences instantiate the same phenomenal properties.”6 Phenomenal properties 
are, in turn, qualitative properties like redness, painfulness, and sweetness. They 
are constitutive of what it’s like to be in a particular mental state.7 
Although it’s tempting to characterize experiential justification as simply 
“justification that is provided by experiential states,” this proposal should be 
rejected. For there can be cases in which an experiential state justifies a belief but 
does so independently of its phenomenal character. Suppose, for instance, that 
whenever you grasp a basic arithmetical truth, the mental state through which you 
grasp this truth presents it to you as a sentence token constructed from bright 
green characters. You are thus aware of an accompanying phenomenal greenness 
whenever you grasp that 28 + 12 = 40. From your own first-person point of view, 
your grasp of the arithmetical proposition is concurrent with your apprehension of 
phenomenal greenness; indeed, both are constitutive of a single mental state. Since 
the state in question has phenomenal character, it’s an experiential state. Even so, 
since its color phenomenology is unrelated to arithmetical truth, it’s quite unlikely 
that this state provides experiential justification for your belief that 28 + 12 = 40.8 
Given the preceding example, we should conclude that an experience e’s 
phenomenal character must play a role in its justifying belief b when the 
justification it provides (with respect to b) is experiential. Here is a more precise 
rendering of this proposal:  
                                                        
6 Chalmers, “Perception,” 50.  
7 There are multiple mental state types that have phenomenal character, including visual states, 
auditory states, tactile states, gustatory states, olfactory states, emotional states, memorial states, 
and imagination states. Some philosophers have proposed that other common mental state types, 
such as occurrent beliefs and desires, have phenomenal character. See, for instance: David 
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); H.H. Price, “Some 
Considerations about Belief,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35 (1934–1935): 229-252; 
Galen Strawson, Mental Reality (second edition) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). Michael 
Tye and other representationalists deny that the states in question have phenomenal character; 
see, for reference, Tye’s Ten Problems of Consciousness, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). I 
take no definite stance on the matter. Nevertheless, it is clear enough that (EXP) need not yield 
the dubious classificatory result that all mental states are experiences. Unconscious, 
subconscious, and dispositional mental states are, presumably, bereft of phenomenal character 
and thus are not classified as experiential states by (EXP). 
8 In his memoir, Daniel Tammet, a synesthetic mathematical savant, reports “seeing numbers as 
shapes, colors, textures, and motions.” This gives my example some purchase. Since Tammet 
reports that the number five sounds like a thunder clap, his thoughts about that number are, 
presumably, experiences. Yet, surely, when he thinks about the sum of five and five the 
accompanying phenomenal character does not play a role in justifying his belief that it is ten. For 
reference see: Daniel Tammet, Born on a Blue Day (New York: The Free Press, 2006), 2. 
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(EJ): For any mental state m and any belief b, m is an experiential justifier for b iff 
m is an experiential state that justifies b in virtue of its phenomenal character. If 
m is an experiential justifier for b, then m can provide experiential justification 
for b.  
To illustrate, suppose Sven has a visual experience as of a black cat on the 
banister. His experience (a) instantiates the property of phenomenal blackness and 
in virtue of doing so (b) provides prima facie experiential justification for the belief 
that something black is on the banister. For if something black were on the 
banister, then, were Sven to look toward the banister, he’d have an experience 
with just that sort of phenomenal character.  
The in-virtue-of relation that is central to (EJ) can be unpacked in multiple 
ways. The task of specifying and endorsing any particular way—i.e., the project of 
developing a general theory of experiential justification—is beyond the scope of 
this essay.9 I therefore leave the in-virtue-of relation at the intuitive level. For 
present purposes, the key point is that m provides experiential justification for b iff 
m’s power to justify b depends upon its phenomenal character.  
One strong reason to endorse (EJ) is that it yields, as should any satisfactory 
account of experiential justification, an illuminating and sensible characterization 
of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. To see this, consider the following rather 
uncontroversial definitions of a posteriori and a priori justification: 
A Posteriori Justification: For any belief b, b is justified a posteriori iff (i) b is 
immediately experientially justified or (ii) b is justifiably inferred from beliefs at 
least one of which is immediately experientially justified.10 
A Priori Justification: For any belief b, b is justified a priori iff (i) b is immediately 
but non-experientially justified or (ii) b is justifiably inferred from beliefs all of 
which are immediately but non-experientially justified. 
When combined with (EJ), the above definitions yield:  
A Posteriori Justification2: For any belief b and justifier j, b is justified a posteriori 
iff (i) b is immediately justified by j in virtue of j’s phenomenal character or (ii) 
                                                        
9 To be clear, the project of developing a general theory of experiential justification includes the 
project of explaining, in detail, how perception justifies belief. This is one of epistemology’s 
central explanatory aims. It should go without saying that I cannot offer a comprehensive 
discussion of this topic in a short essay with a rather different aim; i.e., developing and defending 
an account of what experiential justification is (rather than explaining how and why experiential 
justifiers are justificatory.)  
10 The concept of immediate justification is here understood as justification that is non-
inferential, where non-inferential justification is justification that does not derive from a 
subject’s doxastic states. 
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can be justifiably inferred from at least one belief that is so justified. 
A Priori Justification2: For any belief b and justifier j, b is justified a priori iff (i) b 
is immediately justified by j in virtue of something other than j’s phenomenal 
character or (ii) is justifiably inferred from beliefs all of which are so justified.   
Now, suppose it visually appears to Bill that there’s red bird in the tree. It’s 
reasonable to think that (a) this visual appearance justifies Bill in believing that 
there’s a red bird in the tree and (b) the justification it provides, in this instance, is 
a posteriori. Indeed, this appears to be a paradigm case of a posteriori justification. 
Given (a), A Posteriori Justification2 predicts and explains (b). This is because Bill’s 
visual appearance wouldn’t be able to justify the relevant belief if it didn’t 
instantiate the property of phenomenal redness. Thus, the visual appearance’s 
capacity to justify Bill’s belief depends upon its phenomenal character. The 
justification it provides is thereby a posteriori.  
Now suppose Abby has the intuition that everything that has a shape has a 
size. It’s reasonable to think that (a) this intuition justifies Abby in believing that 
everything that has a shape has a size and (b) the justification it provides in this 
instance is a priori.11 Indeed, this appears to be a paradigm case of a priori 
justification. Given (a), A Priori Justification2 predicts and explains (b). This is 
because, even if we assume Abby’s intuition has phenomenal character (including 
the kind of phenomenal character that would enable her to introspectively identify 
it as an intuition) it would still justify the belief in question if it had a different 
phenomenal character (or no phenomenal character at all).12 Indeed, we can vary 
the intuition’s phenomenal character without modifying its content and, by 
extension, its justificatory powers.  
                                                        
11 I hold that intuitions are intellectual seemings. One influential characterization of intellectual 
seemings is found in: George Bealer, “A Theory of the A Priori,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
81 (2000):1–30. Another is found in: Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). A more recent account is found in Elijah Chudnoff, Intuition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). For present purposes, I withhold judgment on the matter of which 
characterization of intellectual seemings is the most promising.  
12 Assume that intuitions have a certain kind of phenomenal character that enables a subject to 
introspectively identify them as intuitions. Even so, in ordinary circumstances, one suspects that 
intuitions justify beliefs without being introspectively identified as intuitions. For instance, 
Abby’s intuition justifies the belief in question even when she doesn’t engage in any active 
reflection of the sort that would yield judgments like “I am having the intuition that δ” or “This 
thought about δ is an intuition.” For accounts of intuitions that make similar assumptions about 
their phenomenal character, see: Laurence Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 100-110 and Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 105-106. 
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To see this, suppose that when Abby has the intuition in question she also 
becomes aware of a buzzing sound. Indeed, her awareness of the sound is partly 
constitutive of her intuition that everything that has a shape has a size. Even so, if 
the auditory properties of Abby’s intuition were altogether absent, it would still 
have the power to justify her belief that everything that has a shape has a size. In 
this instance, then, the intuition’s capacity to justify Abby’s belief is independent 
of its phenomenal character. The justification it provides is therefore a priori. This 
result, together with the one in the paragraph before last, shows that (EJ) can be 
used to fix the a priori/a posteriori distinction in a way that is consistent with 
paradigm cases of a priori and a posteriori justified belief. And, contra Casullo, (EJ) 
is the product of and is supported by armchair methods; e.g., thought 
experimentation and reflection on hypothetical cases. 
3. Casullo’s Challenge to Phenomenal Theories 
Casullo maintains that phenomenal theories of experiential justification are 
uniformly inadequate. He writes: 
… for the [distinction between experiential and non-experiential states/justifiers] 
to be marked at the phenomenological level, there must be some general 
phenomenological feature that is (a) exemplified in the phenomenological states 
associated with all the various types of sense experience, and (b) is also 
exemplified in the phenomenological states associated with all the other forms of 
experience alleged to be incompatible with a priori justification. It is dubious that 
either condition obtains.13 
                                                        
13 Casullo, A Priori Justification, 150. In both this passage and the chapter from which it is 
drawn, Casullo primarily focuses on critiquing extant accounts of experience rather than 
accounts of experiential justification. Even so, his ultimate focus is squarely on the distinction 
between experiential and non-experiential justification. Indeed, Casullo begins the chapter in 
question by claiming (op. cit., 148) that if “that distinction is not coherent, the traditional debate 
over the a priori is rooted in conceptual confusion. Hence, we now turn to the question of 
whether there is a coherent concept of non-experiential justification.” Given this focus, it is not 
surprising that Casullo moves back and forth between discussing experiential states and 
experiential justification. And it is not surprising that he proposes epistemic conditions on the 
concept of experience, such as the second condition in the passage quoted above. Ultimately, 
Casullo is committed to the view that if we cannot distinguish between experiential and non-
experiential states, then we cannot draw a distinction between experiential and non-experiential 
justification. But as (EJ) shows, this view is unfounded. Even if all occurrent mental states are 
experiences, in the sense that they have phenomenal character, (EJ) can be used to differentiate 
between experiential and non-experiential justification. Thus, (EJ) provides the sort of 
distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification that Casullo takes to be a 
necessary pre-condition for making sense of the a priori.  
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In this passage, Casullo proposes two adequacy conditions on phenomenal 
theories. First, a generality condition: to identify states m1 and m2 as (potential) 
experiential justifiers, we must be able to identify a general phenomenological 
feature they share. Second, the phenomenological feature in question must be 
possessed by justifiers other than sense experiences (e.g. testimonial and memorial 
justifiers) that are widely thought to provide a posteriori (rather than a priori) 
justification.14 He then argues that these conditions are not satisfied by extant 
phenomenal theories and unlikely to be satisfied by any successor theories. 
Casullo notes, correctly, that there are no general phenomenal properties 
common to all sense-experiential states (and, by extension, sense-experiential 
justifiers). For instance, the phenomenal character of visual experiences is quite 
different from the phenomenal character of auditory experiences. Indeed, there do 
not appear to be any phenomenal properties that the two kinds of sensory states 
share (with each other or any other kind of sense-experiential state). As a result of 
this, Casullo infers that no phenomenal theory will meet his generality condition.15 
This conclusion is premature. (EJ) is a phenomenal theory that marks the 
distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification, but it does not 
do so by appeal to any common phenomenal property shared by all paradigm 
experiential states. Instead, (EJ) appeals to the bare instantiation of justification-
enabling phenomenal properties. The theory presupposes that experiential states 
possess the second-order property of having phenomenal character in addition to 
instantiating the particular first-order phenomenal properties that enable 
                                                        
14 This condition is motivated by remarks from Plantinga,Warrant, 91. Plantinga claims that 
memorial and testimonial justification cannot be a priori; this position is no doubt shared by 
other friends of the a priori.  
15 See, for instance, Casullo, A Priori Justification, 150: “[concerning] experiences associated with 
the five senses… we readily distinguish between, say, auditory and visual experiences on the 
basis of differences in their phenomenological character. The fact that these different forms of 
experience (in the broad sense) have a unique phenomenological character is not sufficient to 
ensure that the difference between experiential (in the narrow sense) and non-experiential states 
can be marked in terms of differences in their phenomenological character.” He continues (op. 
cit.), “Roderick Chisholm, for example, characterizes the states associated with the five senses in 
terms of sensible characteristics. Sensible characteristics, in turn, comprise the "proper objects," 
which are unique to each of the senses, along with the "common sensibles," which are common 
to all the senses. Chisholm illustrates the proper objects of each of the senses by providing 
examples of visual characteristics, auditory characteristics, and so on. The common sensibles are 
also illustrated by examples such as rest, number, figure, and magnitude. Hence, in the final 
analysis, Chisholm fails to provide a general characterization of the concept of a sensible 
characteristic. He fails to identify some general phenomenological feature common to sense 
experience in its various forms.” 
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individual state tokens to serve as experiential justifications for specific beliefs. 
Possession of the second-order property is the general phenomenological feature 
these states have in common such that they are experiences. It’s what facilitates 
their falling within a single classificatory category. Moreover, instantiation of the 
relevant first-order properties is what enables token experiential states to provide 
experiential justification. Thus, the general phenomenological feature that 
experiential justifiers share is the second-order property of having justificatory 
powers in virtue of their phenomenal character.  In view of the above, it is safe to 
say that (EJ) is a phenomenal theory that meets Casullo’s (well-motivated) first 
condition. 
Casullo’s second condition, by contrast, is not well motivated. This is 
because, aside from the core condition of being non-experiential in character, 
there aren’t any necessary conditions on a priori justifiers—conditions of the sort 
that would decisively prohibit memorial and testimonial justifiers from being a 
priori—that have been uniformly endorsed by advocates of the a priori. Indeed, a 
review of the recent literature reveals that a variety of different and sometimes 
incompatible conditions on a priori justification have been proposed.16 
For instance, Kitcher claims that if b is justified a priori, then its justification 
is infallible.17 Swinburne claims that if b is justified a priori, then it is necessarily 
true.18 Ewing claims that if b is justified a priori, then it is self-evident.19 By 
contrast, Kaplan calls attention to the belief that I am here now, arguing that it can 
be justified a priori despite the fact that its content is contingent and its 
provenance is introspection.20 And Burge contends that testimony can provide a 
priori entitlement.21 What the views of these philosophers have in common is a 
conception of a priori justification as experience-independent justification. Beyond 
this minimalist conception of a priori justification, however, there appears to be 
little consensus about whether there are additional conditions on the a priori and, 
if so, how they should be articulated.  
                                                        
16 In support of this point see Casullo’s own review of the literature in A Priori Justification, 9-
32.  
17 Philip Kitcher, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985). 
18 R.G. Swinburne, “Analyticity, Necessity, and Apriority,” Mind 84, 334 (1975): 225–243. 
19 A. C. Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1951), 26-52.  
20 David Kaplan, “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and 
Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals,” in Themes from Kaplan, eds. Joseph 
Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 481–614. 
21 Tyler Burge, “Content Preservation,” The Philosophical Review 102, 4 (1993): 457-488. 
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Given this rather significant absence of consensus, it’s hard to see why we 
should follow Casullo in presupposing that an acceptable phenomenal theory must 
classify as experiential those justifiers—in particular testimonial and memorial 
justifiers—that some philosophers have “alleged to be incompatible with a priori 
justification.” Perhaps the most sensible way of drawing the distinction between 
experiential and non-experiential justification just cannot accommodate the 
complete set of views held by some of the leading champions of the a priori. So 
much the worse, then, for them! 
In conjunction with this point, it should be acknowledged that beliefs about 
color incompatibilities might be cited as counterexamples to (EJ). This because 
many philosophers think that the belief that nothing can be red all over and green 
all over at the same time is a paradigm case of a priori justified belief.22 Since, 
however, this belief concerns phenomenal properties like red and green, one might 
conclude that any mental state that justifies it will only do so in virtue of its 
phenomenal character. If that’s the case, then, given the classificatory scheme that 
results from (EJ), the belief that nothing can be red all over and green all over at 
the same time will, surprisingly, be justified a posteriori. And this outcome might 
be thought to undermine the claim that (EJ) fixes the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction in an acceptable way.  
Although the force of this objection should be recognized, there is a 
straightforward tu quoque defense that rests on the observation that color 
incompatibility claims are very odd. They are alleged to be necessary truths.23 Yet 
they appear to be expressed by synthetic sentences and to concern relations 
between phenomenal properties, acquaintance with which results from particular 
visual experiences of contingent empirical entities and events.24 This quizzical 
conjunction of attributes, however, is precisely why color incompatibilities are 
philosophically interesting: they are not very easily captured by a number of 
otherwise promising classificatory schemas. Indeed, Dale Jacquette makes the 
provocative claim that Wittgenstein’s abandonment of the semantic program of the 
Tractatus was the result of his “dissatisfaction with its…implications for the color 
incompatibility problem.”25 Jerrold Katz makes the even more provocative claim 
                                                        
22 See, for instance: Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reason, 2; Quassim Cassam, The Possibility of 
Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 196-210. 
23 One popular source for this allegation is: D. F. Pears, “Incompatibilities of Colours,” in Logic 
and Language (second series), ed. Antony Flew (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 112-122. 
24 For an early defense of the syntheticity of color incompatibility claims see: Arthur Pap, “Are 
All Necessary Propositions Analytic?” Philosophical Review 50, 4 (1949): 299-320. 
25 Dale Jacquette, Wittgenstein’s Thought in Transition (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University 
Press, 1998), 185.  
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that “The three movements in which most analytic philosophy of this century has 
been done, Wittgenstein’s late philosophy, Rudolf Carnap’s neo-Humean 
empiricism, and W.V. Quine’s neo-Millian empiricism, were each, in large 
measure, responses to the [color incompatibility] problem.”26 Unsurprisingly, then, 
there has emerged a large body of literature that attempts to make sense of the 
star-crossed semantic, epistemic, and modal properties of color incompatibility 
claims.27 And given the significant classificatory challenges found in that literature, 
I should think that if an otherwise plausible theory of the a priori assigns a 
posteriori status to beliefs about color incompatibilities, this hardly suffices for 
outright rejection of the theory.28 
                                                        
26 Jerrold Katz, “The Problem in Twentieth Century Philosophy,” The Journal of Philosophy 95, 
11 (1998): 549 
27 For a strong bibliography and an overview of many significant twentieth century papers on 
color incompatibilities, see: R. G. A. Dolby, “Philosophy and the Incompatibility of Colours,” 
Analysis 34 (1973): 8-16. 
28 I should also note that there is at least some basis for thinking that claims about color 
incompatibilities are analytic. For a classic defense of this view, see: Hilary Putnam, “Reds, 
Greens, and Logical Analysis,” The Philosophical Review 65, 2 (1956): 206-217. For a qualified 
defense, see: Katz, “The Problem,” 574-575. More recently, Brian Kierland has argued, with some 
force, that nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time is either analytic or 
contingent (contra the view that it is necessary but not analytic). For reference see: Brian 
Kierland, “Necessity and Color Incompatibility,” Disputatio 31, 4 (2011): 235-237. If these 
philosophers are correct and color incompatibility claims are (in some sense) analytic, then it’s 
unlikely that beliefs about them are justified by appeal to the phenomenal character of the 
justifying mental state. I don’t purport to offer an account of how beliefs with contents expressed 
by analytic sentences are justified. But presumably such beliefs are about logical relations 
between concepts and/or meanings. And neither concepts nor meanings are colored. Thus, it’s 
hard to see how color phenomenology would have any direct role to play in justifying beliefs 
concerning logical relations between concepts and/or meanings.  
Now, suppose that claims about color incompatibilities are synthetic. If so, then there’s some 
basis for thinking that they are about universals; i.e., that nothing can be red all over and green 
all over at the same time ultimately makes a claim about the incompatibility of the properties 
redness and greenness qua universals. Although it’s tempting to think claims about redness and 
greenness are going to be justified in virtue of the phenomenal character of their justifiers, this 
temptation can (and perhaps should) be resisted. For one thing, if we say that, for instance, 
redness is itself a red entity, we invite Plato’s Third Man to lecture us about the danger of 
explanatory regresses. If, however, we deny that redness is a red entity, then it’s rather difficult 
to see how red color phenomenology would play a direct role in justifying beliefs about redness 
(though having experiences with red phenomenal character is perhaps a necessary precondition 
for forming beliefs about redness). Alternatively, if we insist that redness is red, despite the 
potential explanatory regress, it’s still difficult to see how red color phenomenology would play a 
direct role in justifying beliefs about redness qua universal. This is because any mental state that 
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Suppose that, despite the concerns expressed above, we accept Casullo’s 
second condition. The point of the second condition is, it seems, to prevent 
testimonial and memorial justifiers from being categorized as a priori. Thus, it 
should be noted that there is a reasonable basis for thinking that (EJ) classifies 
(most familiar) testimonial and memorial justifiers as experiential. Assume, with a 
number of prominent philosophers, that memory and testimony are preservative 
sources of justification; i.e., they maintain and transmit previously acquired 
justification rather than generating new justification.29 On this view, when a 
testimonial or memorial justifier is anchored by an experiential generative justifier, 
the justification it provides is also experiential. We should therefore expect a priori 
and a posteriori status to track generative justifiers rather than preservative 
justifiers. If that’s correct, then (EJ) will classify as a posteriori any testimonial and 
memorial justifiers that transmit (or preserve) experiential justification, even if 
their justificatory powers are independent of their immediate phenomenal 
character. This, in turn, should moderate the concern that a phenomenal theory 
such as (EJ) would yield untenable classificatory results.30 
                                                                                                                      
has redness as part of its phenomenal character will instantiate a specific shade (or shades) of red. 
But the obviousness and immediacy of nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same 
time suggests it’s not justified by considering the incompatibility of this particular shade of red 
with that particular shade of green and then making an inductive inference. Perhaps, instead, we 
immediately grasp, however inchoately, that nothing can be red all over and green all over at the 
same time is an instance of the more general claim that any two determinates of a determinable 
exclude one another (e.g., that being ten pounds excludes being twelve pounds). This proposal is 
hinted at, though not fully developed in: W.D. Hart, The Evolution of Logic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 40. In a related context, Mares notes that “we do sometimes 
see that certain concepts have logical relations to one another and this does not require further 
propositional thought…just an ability (that is innate or learned) to see certain logical 
connections.” For reference see: Edwin Mares, A Priori (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2011), 48-49. If the above is correct, then maybe color incompatibility beliefs 
are justified in virtue of our grasping that their contents exemplify a relation between 
determinates and determinables in general rather than a relation between color properties in 
particular. It would then seem, however, that color phenomenology is epistemically superfluous 
with respect to the positive epistemic status of nothing can be red all over and green all over at 
the same time.  
29 See, for instance: Robert Audi, Epistemology: a Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of 
Knowledge, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 131-153; Michael Dummett, “Testimony and 
Memory,” in Knowing from Words, eds. Bimal Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 251-272; Plantinga, Warrant, 65-88. 
30 It should be emphasized that there is a striking lack of consensus about how to even begin to 
model testimonial and memorial justification. For that reason, it hardly seems appropriate to 
demand, well in advance of any such consensus, that testimonial and memorial justifiers be 
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4. The Concept of Phenomenal Properties 
It may be that Casullo intends to present a deeper challenge to phenomenal 
theories of experiential justification. This is suggested when Casullo claims, while 
critiquing Roderick Chisholm’s analysis of experience, that Chisholm “fails to 
provide a general characterization of the concept of a sensible characteristic”  and 
“… fails to identify some general phenomenological feature common to sense 
experience in its various forms.”31 The second sentence here suggests that Casullo 
wants Chisholm to identify a feature or property common to all sense-experiential 
states (and thus to all experiential justifiers). As I demonstrated in the previous 
section, (EJ) satisfies this demand. The first sentence, however, suggests that 
Casullo may also want an explication of the concept of a phenomenal property. 
Notice, then, that Casullo takes Chisholm to task for failing to provide a 
general account of the concept of a sensible characteristic. Chisholm stands 
accused, rather like Euthyphro, of giving mere examples of φ (in this case colors, 
odors, shapes, and so forth) where what’s needed is a theoretical definition or 
conceptual analysis of φ. Although Chisholm is focused on sensible characteristics 
(which he thinks of as the objects of sense-experiential states and thus as properties 
of external entities) rather than phenomenal properties, one might expect Casullo 
to level similar accusations at the advocates of (EJ). For if (a) what experiential 
justifiers have in common is that their justificatory powers depend upon their 
phenomenal character and (b) phenomenal character is understood in terms of 
instantiating phenomenal properties, one might sensibly wonder what makes the 
properties in question phenomenal. Perhaps, then, Casullo intends to question 
whether the concept of a phenomenal property (and the related concept of 
phenomenal character) can be given an intelligible explication. If not, then the 
second-order properties that fix (EJ) cannot be clearly articulated. No doubt this 
would be cause for concern. For if there is no basis for distinguishing phenomenal 
                                                                                                                      
classified as a posteriori. Even so, aside from the preservative model, there are other reasonable 
positions on testimonial and memorial justification that do not, given (EJ), yield the result that 
(most) memorial and testimonial justifiers are a priori.  For instance, one might conclude, after 
adopting the Humean position that testimonial justification is reducible to a conjunction of 
perceptual, memorial, and inferential justification, that testimonial justification is always 
inferential. One might argue, similarly, that memorial justification is inferential insofar as the 
memory that p is a premise, along with the belief that one’s memory is reliable, in an argument 
that can be used to justify the belief that p. In each case, there will usually be empirical premises 
at work in the generation of testimonial and memorial justification.  
31 Casullo, A Priori Justification, 150.  
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properties from other kinds of properties, then, by extension, there’s no basis for 
distinguishing experiential justifiers from other kinds of justifiers.32 
Unfortunately, there’s no widely accepted explication, criterion, or set of 
jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept of a phenomenal 
property. Instead, when philosophers introduce the terms “phenomenal property” 
and “phenomenal character,” they usually define them by ostentation. For 
instance, here is how Chalmers introduces the concept of a phenomenal property:  
Consciousness involves the instantiation of phenomenal properties. These 
properties characterize aspects of what it is like to be a subject (what it is like to 
be me right now, for example, or what it is like to be a bat) or what it is like to be 
in a mental state (what it is like to see a certain shade of green, for example, or 
what it is like to feel a certain sharp pain). Whenever there is something it is like 
to be in a mental state, that state has specific phenomenal properties.33 
Chalmers points to various first-order “feelings” and claims that what they 
have in common is that there is something that it is like to have them. Definitions 
of this kind pervade the philosophical literature and are widely taken to render the 
concept of a phenomenal property intelligible. While Chalmers’ definition may not 
be as illuminating as we’d like, it does pick out a feature of numerous mental states 
that we are prepared to grant prima facie recognition; namely, that they have 
properties that somehow give rise to something-it-is-likeness.  
When we reflect on a token pain state, we can discern that it has among its 
various properties both painfulness and being-indexed-to-time-t. It’s doubtful that 
there is “something it is like” when a mental state instantiates the latter property. 
By contrast, the former property is a paradigm of something-it-is-like-ness. Thus, 
there is a seemingly intelligible distinction between the phenomenal and non-
phenomenal properties of mental states. Of course, absent some further account of 
“something-it-is-like-ness,” this approach may well be hopeless; it offers only to 
exchange one insufficiently clear term for another. Does this point undercut (EJ)? 
The proper response here is to note that even among philosophers who 
think phenomenal properties themselves are superfluous, explicable in terms of 
representational content, or otherwise able to be explained away, there is a near 
consensus that the concept of a phenomenal property is intelligible.34 There is 
                                                        
32 It wouldn’t be hard to miss this point in Casullo’s discussion of phenomenal theories, since the 
discussion goes by very quickly. Indeed, it lasts for only three paragraphs.  
33 David Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience,” in The Future for 
Philosophy, ed. Brian Leiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 154-155. 
34 For (EJ) to be intelligible, what’s needed, at a minimum, is a coherent conceptual distinction 
between phenomenal properties and other kinds of mental state properties. We don’t necessarily 
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agreement that, for instance, there is something it’s like to hit one’s thumb with a 
hammer. And none of us would like to be hit with a hammer precisely because we 
have a sense of what it would be like. If we knew how to theoretically account for 
something-it-is-likeness, we might then be in a position to deliver a satisfying 
explication of the concept. Still, a consensus prevails despite our philosophical 
failings. We are able to sensibly use the concept of a phenomenal property even 
though we cannot provide necessary and sufficient conditions for its extension. 
And we are not required to give a final analysis of a concept (or distinction) before 
putting it to use. Indeed, as Michael Huemer contends, “no generally accepted 
analysis of any philosophically interesting term has yet been devised.”35 If he’s 
correct, then such a constraint would render much of philosophy (and ordinary 
conversation) impossible; ergo, the constraint is untenable. Moreover, given the 
rather poor track record to which Huemer points, even those of us who aren’t 
quite as pessimistic about conceptual analysis should nevertheless be wary of any 
proposal to link the intelligibility or theoretical bona fides of a concept to our grasp 
of its final analysis.  
According to (EJ), when mental states that possess phenomenal character 
justify beliefs in virtue of that character, the kind of justification they provide is 
experiential. If Casullo is prepared to deny the very intelligibility of the concept of 
a phenomenal property, he can then deny that (EJ) is an intelligible account of 
experiential justification.36 But this would be a high price to pay for a rather 
limited philosophical victory. For the concept of a phenomenal property is 
intelligible, even if the best we can do to limn the borders of its extension is to 
                                                                                                                      
need this conceptual distinction to track a fundamental metaphysical difference. It could be that 
representationalism is correct; i.e., it could be that phenomenal character supervenes on (or 
consists in) representational content and that phenomenal properties are not sui generis 
properties but supervene upon (or are a species of) representational properties. Even so, if we can 
conceptually differentiate the phenomenal-seeming representational properties from other 
representational properties, a view that advocates of representationalism tend to endorse, then 
that’s all we need to ensure that (EJ) makes sense. The same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
other reductionist approaches to the metaphysics of phenomenal properties. For more on 
representationalism see: Alex Byrne, “Intentionalism Defended,” The Philosophical Review 110, 
2 (2001): 199-240; Fred Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press), 1995; Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, 1995.  
35 Michael Huemer, “The Failure of Analysis and the Nature of Concepts,” in The Palgrave 
Handbook of Philosophical Methods, ed. Chris Daly (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 52. 
36 For some evidence that Casullo does not think the concept of a phenomenal property is 
unintelligible, see: Albert Casullo, “Phenomenal Properties,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
60, 2 (1982):167-169. 
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point to various mental states and note that they feel some kind of way.37 Indeed, 
even if the concept of a phenomenal property is sui generis, we can still sensibly 
employ it in our account of experiential justification. 
5. Implications for Casullo’s Project 
Casullo claims that “[armchair] arguments both for and against the existence of a 
priori knowledge are largely inconclusive” and, as a result, we should take “a 
different approach to addressing the issue of the existence of a priori knowledge: 
one that appeals to empirical evidence.”38 The proposal that we use largely or 
exclusively empirical methods to determine whether there is a priori knowledge or 
justification (and, if there is, its nature and scope) is Casullo’s signature 
contribution to the literature on the a priori. Its credibility rests upon the claim 
that armchair methods cannot yield an adequate account of experiential 
justification; i.e., premise (2) in my reconstruction of his argument for empirical 
investigation.   
In preceding sections, I presented a prima facie plausible armchair-based 
phenomenal theory of experiential justification—(EJ)—which says, roughly, that 
m provides experiential justification for b iff m’s power to justify b depends upon 
its phenomenal character. I then showed that (EJ) is not susceptible to Casullo’s 
attempts to refute phenomenal theories. This result undermines premise (2) of 
Casullo’s argument for empirical investigation. Thus, I conclude that armchair 
methods can and should play a substantial role in our ongoing investigation of the 
a priori.39 
                                                        
37 Perhaps there will be intractable disagreements, then, about what properties are correctly 
classified as phenomenal. That result is perfectly consistent with the claim that there is a 
category of properties that are what they are because there is something it is like for them to be 
instantiated.  
38 Albert Casullo, “Response to my Critics: Chris Pincock, Lisa Warenski and Jonathan 
Weinberg,” Philosophical Studies 173, 6 (2016):1706. 
39 I would like to thank Walter Edelberg, Alejandro Vazquez del Mercado, and an anonymous 
referee for helpful feedback on this paper and/or the views it expresses.  
